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CHAPTER 6

# Impact of the energy crisis in 2022 on the German political landscape and resource policy

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**Abstract:** The objective of this chapter is to deliver an in-depth analysis of the contemporary political situation in Germany, focused on Germany's raw materials policy. The discussion will address the implications of the policy of "change through trade" (*Wandel durch Handel*) and the *Energiewende*, which led to Germany's growing dependence on Russian raw materials, and the Kremlin's application of energy coercion policies as a means of exerting influence over Berlin. This chapter will demonstrate Germany's endeavours in the area of raw materials diversification, with a focus on the strategies employed to ensure the stability of supply.

**Keywords:** Energy security, *Energiewende*, Russo-German relations, energy transition.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The German energy transition, also known as *Energiewende*, has long been a cornerstone Germany's domestic and foreign policy. Central to these ambitions are the objectives of decarbonisation, energy independence and long-term sustainability. Thus far, the *Energiewende* has significantly reshaped the country's energy system (Wiertz et al., 2023, pp. 1–2). However, the 2022 energy crisis, triggered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the collapse of energy ties between Berlin and Moscow,

called into question the foundation of this transition, leading to unforeseen consequences (Wiertz et al., 2023, pp. 1–2). This chapter investigates Germany's vulnerability to raw material shocks, focusing on the impact of fossil fuel imports on energy security and political stability. It examines how the sudden collapse of Russian gas flows disrupted the energy architecture of Europe's largest economy, triggering economic hardship, political polarisation and a reorientation of energy and security policy.

This chapter aims to answer the following research questions:

- How did resource dependency shape Germany's vulnerability during the 2022 crisis?
- How did Germany address the shortage of gas and manage supply security post-2022?
- How do German political parties frame and debate the issue of fossil raw materials?

The hypothesis guiding this study is that Germany's lack of sufficient domestic fossil resources exacerbated its energy vulnerability and contributed to the 2022 crisis, which triggered structural changes in both energy strategy and political discourse. Methodologically, this chapter employs qualitative analysis of policy reports, academic articles, think tank podcasts and electoral data. The study is based on three primary sources and reports on Germany's energy policies during and after the crisis, and international analyses of the political impact of the 2022 energy crisis. The chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 provides historical and geopolitical context for Germany's fossil fuel reliance, particularly in relation to Russia. Section 3 analyses the crisis itself, including infrastructure measures, diversification strategies and their socio-economic impact. Section 4 explores the evolving positions of key political parties towards fossil resources. The final section discusses the long-term implications for Germany's energy transformation and political landscape.

## 2. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The Federal Republic of Germany, a highly developed nation both economically and technologically, faces significant challenges due to its heavy reliance on fuel imports. In light of the current geopolitical landscape – particularly the war in Ukraine – this dependence poses a substantial problem for Germany (Halser & Paraschiv, 2022, p. 8). Additionally, the transition to renewable energy sources (RES), the phase-out of nuclear power and the pursuit of increasingly ambitious decarbonisation which is to reduce them by 55% by 2030 with respect to 1990, further complicate the situation (Kędzierski et. al., 2020, p. 8–13). Germany's considerable energy needs stem from its status as the world's fourth largest economy by GDP and the largest in Europe. At the same time, the country has positioned itself as a leader in promoting renewable energy and reducing carbon emissions, seeking to enhance its soft power influence globally (Kędzierski et al., 2020 p. 28).

### ENERGY AND CLIMATE POLICY

Since the 1980s, Germany has demonstrated a strong commitment to ambitious greenhouse gas emission reduction targets, recognising its role as a leader in environmental stewardship. A fundamental aspect of this commitment has been setting an example for other nations to promote a global shift toward reduced environmental impact (Kędzierski et al., 2020, p. 8). Germany aimed to catalyse similar actions by other countries, with the support of the European Commission. Between 1990 and 2009, Germany successfully reduced its emissions from 1,251 million tonnes of $CO_2$ to 908 million tonnes, largely due to the modernisation or decommissioning of former GDR industries. During the same period, the United Kingdom (UK) reduced its emissions by 25%, France by 8% and Italy by 4% (Kędzierski et. al., 2020, p. 9).

Since 2010, Germany has experienced an upward trend in greenhouse gas emissions. In 2011, Angela Merkel's government, with Merkel then serving as chancellor of Germany, decided to phase out nuclear power plants by 2022 – a move widely considered the symbolic start of the *Energiewende*. This decision resulted in an initial surge in emissions during the early stages of the decade, due to increased reliance on lignite and hard coal. The growth in the share of RES within the energy mix proved inadequate in counterbalancing this increase (Kędzierski et. al., 2020, p. 16).

Germany's emissions have been on a downward trend since 2016, largely due to the substitution of coal with less polluting natural gas. However, the nation has only recently achieved a level of emissions comparable to that of 2009, marking a significant delay compared to the initially anticipated 2016 emissions peak. Despite this progress, increasing pressure from various groups continues to advocate for more ambitious reductions in $CO_2$ emissions (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2020a.). A prime example of this pressure is the 2014 European Council Summit, which called for the EU to increase its emissions reduction target by a minimum of 40% by 2030. The achievement of the target by Germany was initially met with scepticism, as projections indicated that instead of the anticipated 40% reduction in 2020 compared to 1990, only 32% reduction would be achieved. However, projections did not account for the accelerating decline in coal use, and although Germany fell short of the target, emissions were ultimately reduced by 35%. Between 2016 and 2019, coal use fell from 40% to 28% (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2020a).

## *WANDEL DURCH HANDEL*

The concept of *Wandel durch Handel*, which can be translated as change through trade, is an idea that generations of German politicians have embraced. This concept was deeply rooted in post-reunification foreign policy, which assumed that strengthening trade and economic relations, especially with Russia, would lead to political change and pacification

through the creation of mutual dependencies (Bunde, 2025, p. 4). The doctrine of economic interdependence was adopted by the doctrine of Ostpolitik during the Cold War, aiming for a pacifist outcome. German Ostpolitik was the policy towards Russia and its neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe. Historically, this policy has sought to maintain a balance between relations with Russia and its neighbouring states. Nevertheless, since 1999, a considerable paradigm shift has occurred, resulting in the prioritisation of relations with Russia over other states in the region and overall alliance policy (Krause, 2023, p. 126 ). In the context of German foreign policy, particularly regarding relations with Russia, this concept posited that the fostering trade and economic ties with Russia would gradually liberalise and transform Russia's political landscape. In German foreign policy discourse, this perspective maintained that gas pipeline projects with Russia were purely commercial ventures, without security implications. German politicians adhered to a doctrine of "commercial logic" and remained sceptical that economic interdependence could be exploited for geopolitical purposes. The concept of *Wandel durch Handel* was widely accepted among the German elite and broader society, defining the boundaries of what was deemed feasible within the context of German foreign policy (Bunde, 2025, p. 5).

## THE HISTORY OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

As early as the 1960s and 1970s, the USSR began exporting natural gas to Western Europe, starting with Austria in 1968 and followed by West Germany in 1973. These relations were both economic and political in nature. They formed an integral component of the broader policy of détente, particularly within the framework of Chancellor Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik, aimed at normalising relations with the Eastern Bloc. For the USSR, the export of gas provided a source of hard currency and a means to expand its influence in Western Europe (Bieliszczuk, 2018, p. 18).

In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation continued to utilise energy as a foreign policy instrument, as

articulated in the 1991 Falin and Kvitsky doctrine (Bieliszczuk, 2018, p. 25). This doctrine called for military influence to be replaced by economic influence, making the countries of the former post-Soviet bloc increasingly dependent on raw materials from Russia, thus maintaining their sphere of interest (Mróz & Paszkowski, 2023, p. 71). In addition to its role as an export commodity, natural gas became a political instrument, particularly with the former Eastern Bloc countries. This was exemplified by several interruptions of gas supplies to Ukraine and other countries in the region to exert political or economic pressure. Furthermore, difficulties in gas transit through Ukraine – encompassing disputes over prices, debts and illegal off-takes – prompted Russia to construct alternative transmission routes. The first step was the construction of the Yamal-Europe pipeline. However, the decision to build Nord Stream 1 (NS1) in 2006 was pivotal, as it enabled the complete bypass of Ukraine and Belarus. The pipeline became operational in 2011 (Bieliszczuk, 2018 p. 29).

In this context, the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) project appears as a logical continuation of Russia's export strategy. As with its predecessor, the objective was to increase gas transport capacity to Germany and other parts of Europe, while circumventing Ukrainian territory. Despite its official presentation as a purely economic project, NS2 had a profound political and geostrategic dimension. In historical context, the NS2 project represented not only the strengthening of Russian-German ties, but also a repetition of the pattern whereby gas supply served as a tool of international politics (Bieliszczuk, 2018, p. 25–26).

## CONSEQUENCES OF ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

Russia's historical rivalry with the West has been characterised by a rejection of values promoted by Western nations. Rather than advocating for individual freedom and human rights, Russia placed an emphasis on authoritarian rule and a neo-imperialist political approach, presenting the West as degenerate and corrupt. The prevailing sentiment throughout history suggests that the prospect of peaceful coexistence was regarded

not merely as a possibility, but as an inevitability. Moreover, it is Germany that has been identified as a potential mediator between Western and Russian interests. However, the war in Ukraine provided a unique opportunity to test this approach (Rebes, 2017, p. 60).

From Russia's perspective, it is engaged in an ongoing conflict with the West; consequently, it employs two primary instruments in its efforts to counteract the West's actions: military force (which was put to use in Ukraine in the form of a full-scale invasion) and energy resources. Russia seeks to avoid confrontation with NATO, yet it has resorted to the use of energy as a bargaining chip in an attempt to exert pressure on the West (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2022). Russia's strategic aim is to weaken the West, thereby creating an energy crisis that is anticipated to culminate in a political crisis. This destabilisation may prompt governments to review their policies towards Russia and the war in Ukraine. Russia aims to pressure the West into compelling Kyiv to agree to a *de facto* ceasefire on Russian terms and to reduce its support for Ukraine in the form of arms supplies. From an economic perspective, this demonstrates the continued use of natural gas as a tool of economic pressure of Russia (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2022). Concurrently, there have been calls for the resumption of transmission via NS2. In a similar vein, Russia utilised NS1 to pursue its agenda during the war, leading to a 40% reduction in gas transmission in June 2022 and a complete halt of flows for 10 days on July 10th. Moreover, Russia raised the issue of turbines held by Canada under sanctions, with Germany requesting the return of these turbines. Officially, Gazprom has confirmed its inability to restore normal gas transmission through NS1. EU leaders have accused the Russian government of deliberately reducing gas supplies to Europe to prevent the replenishment of gas storage facilities in preparation for the winter period. This strategy appears to be motivated by creating an atmosphere of instability and fear among European nations, potentially influencing their decision-making process and securing an exception to sanctions. The strategy of blackmail and the maintenance of low supply levels, combined with deliberate transport issues, is intended to coerce

the West into making economic or political concessions to secure the supply (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2022).

Since 2022, Russia has shifted its approach to Gazprom – from presenting it as a reliable supplier to weaponising it for geopolitical leverage. The Kremlin has been willing to sacrifice up to three-quarters of Gazprom's revenue to pressure Western states, even at the cost of damaging its own credibility as a trading partner. This strategy aims to coerce political concessions and foster divisions within the EU, where some states may feel more privileged in energy access. These tensions are further exacerbated by supply uncertainty and rising energy prices (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2022).

In 2022, Germany was distinguished by some of the highest energy prices in Europe, stemming from a long-standing reliance on Russian raw materials and imports. A growing expectation persists that Russia will continue using gas as blackmail. Extremist groups such as the German left and AfD have called for lifting sanctions to restore access to raw materials, citing their pro-Russian orientation. Similar appeals emerged within the eastern CDU/CSU, where sanctions were portrayed as harming eastern Germany rather than Russia (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2022).

Germany's longstanding energy partnership with Russia, once perceived as a pillar of economic pragmatism and stability, has emerged as a critical geopolitical vulnerability in the wake of the 2022 energy crisis.

## 3. ANALYSIS

### GERMAN REACTION TO ENERGY CRISIS

Germany's pre-2022 energy architecture relied heavily on Russian natural gas, with dependency exceeding 50% (IEA, 2025, p. 35). This dependence, coupled with minimal domestic production capacity (6% of demand) and limited strategic reserves, created acute vulnerability when Russian supplies were disrupted (IEA, 2025, p. 35). The Nord Stream

infrastructure sabotage and supply curtailment precipitated what the IEA termed "one of the most serious raw material crises in modern German history" (IEA, 2025, p. 12).

The German government's crisis response centred on rapid infrastructure development and supply diversification. In the short term, the government focused on crisis containment through emergency procurement, accelerated infrastructure deployment and temporary regulatory relaxations. The commissioning of floating LNG terminals, beginning with Wilhelmshaven in December 2022, followed by facilities in Mukran and Brunsbüttel, represented unprecedented acceleration in German infrastructure development (IEA, 2025, pp. 35–36). This expansion was enabled by the LNG Acceleration Act, which not only streamlined approval processes but incorporated provisions for future hydrogen compatibility (IEA, 2025, p. 36). Simultaneously, the activation of dormant coal plants was authorised to stabilise the power grid during peak demand, despite environmental opposition. Supply diversification was achieved through new long-term contracts with Qatar, Norway and the United States, fundamentally realigning Germany's energy relationships (IEA, 2025, p. 35). Regulatory interventions, including mandated storage requirements, successfully achieved 95% capacity before winter 2022–2023 despite initial commercial resistance (IEA, 2025, p. 36). The crisis catalysed abandonment of the *Wandel durch Handel* doctrine that had guided German-Russian energy relations. The Scholz government not only suspended Nord Stream 2 but explicitly acknowledged the strategic failure of previous policy (IEA, 2025, p. 13). Germany intensified utilisation of Western pipeline connections with the Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark, while increasing LNG imports via European hubs (IEA, 2025, pp. 35–36).

Demand-side management proved equally significant, with consumption decreasing 18% between 2021–2023 through industrial agreements, conservation measures and price signals (IEA, 2025, p. 35). However, these savings came at a social and political cost, as lower-income households and energy-intensive manufacturing sectors bore the brunt of

rising prices and usage restrictions. This reduction, though effective, imposed disproportionate burdens on energy-intensive industries and lower-income households.

Germany's energy crisis response represents a paradigm shift from market-driven to security-oriented resource policy. The government reframed its approach under the concept of crisis resilience, prioritising supply security and industrial protection over cost efficiency. Despite political costs, including temporary coal reactivation and high consumer prices, Germany developed its first coherent fossil resource strategy since the 1970s.

## ENERGY PRICES DURING THE 2022 CRISIS AND ITS POLITICAL IMPORTANCE

One of the most immediate and disruptive consequences of the 2022 energy crisis in Germany was the unprecedented surge in energy prices. Before Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Germany sourced over 55% of its gas imports from Russia, making it one of the most gas-dependent countries in Europe (IEA, 2025, p. 35). The rapid reduction in Russian gas deliveries, combined with market panic and supply uncertainty, drove electricity prices to record highs. In August 2022, wholesale electricity prices reached €669.44 per megawatt-hour (MWh), a tenfold increase from 2020 levels (Trading Economics, 2023).

These price hikes had cascading economic and social effects. Inflation surged to 10.4% in October 2022, the highest rate recorded in reunified Germany (Destatis, 2023). Households, particularly those with lower incomes, were disproportionately affected. Meanwhile, energy-intensive industries faced significant operational disruptions, prompting calls for compensation and state support (Halser & Paraschiv, 2022, p. 19).

Despite the turmoil, support for the *Energiewende* – Germany's long-standing transition to renewable energy – remained relatively high. As of 2020, approximately 80% of the population supported the shift to renewables, with the Greens securing around 20% of the vote (Ośrodek

Studiów Wschodnich, 2020a). However, the energy price crisis exacerbated political divides and tested this consensus. Populist parties, particularly the AfD, framed the energy transition as a costly and elitist project. Their rhetoric found traction in regions where the economic burden of transition was most acutely felt (Yazar & Haarstad, 2023, p. 6–7).

This politicisation of energy was especially visible in the discursive strategies of the AfD, which increasingly portrayed climate policy as a threat to national identity and economic security. Accusations of an "eco-dictatorship" became central elements of the party's communication (Hernandes & Kalanaki, 2025), particularly in economically disadvantaged eastern states such as Saxony and Thuringia. These regions, historically more reliant on lignite and coal industries (Frymark, 2024), experienced higher vulnerability to energy inflation. The relative weakness of renewable infrastructure in the east and lower household income levels contributed to a deeper sense of marginalisation. Electoral results reflect this divide: by 2025, the AfD had doubled its vote share nationally, from 10.4% to 20% (Statista, 2025).

In contrast, the Greens reinforced their position as leading advocates of climate policy, arguing for faster implementation of renewables and social justice mechanisms to ensure equity in the transition. The CDU/CSU, while broadly supportive of climate goals, focused on maintaining industrial competitiveness and cushioning vulnerable social groups. This included criticism of the pace of the *Energiewende*, and a greater emphasis on affordability and stability (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2020b).

In response to the crisis, the federal government introduced emergency measures, including energy subsidies, one-time relief payments and the gas price brake. Moreover, the rapid commissioning of LNG terminals, such as the one in Wilhelmshaven in December 2022, helped diversify supply (IEA, 2025, p. 36). Yet the longer-term question remains whether Germany can sustain public support for the transition amid high costs and geopolitical instability.

Economic forecasts indicate that achieving full decarbonisation could cost up to €2 trillion by 2050, placing additional pressure on public

budgets and political consensus (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2020b). At the same time, Germany aspires to global leadership in climate governance – a central component of its soft power strategy. Despite accounting for only around 2% of global emissions, it seeks to set an example of a viable low-carbon transition (Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, 2020b). The energy crisis made clear that affordability and resilience must become core pillars of the *Energiewende*, not just ecological ambition. Failure to address the social dimension of energy prices risks further polarisation and the erosion of trust in democratic institutions.

## GAS DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES AFTER 2022

As a response to the unprecedented disruption of Russian gas supplies in 2022, Germany initiated a structural redefinition of its gas import system, centred around the rapid development of domestic liquefied natural gas (LNG) infrastructure. Until that point, Germany had no operational LNG terminals and relied entirely on pipeline imports. Following the collapse of Germany's primary gas supplier, the creation of direct LNG import capacity became a cornerstone of the country's energy security strategy.

By 2023, LNG accounted for 8% of Germany's total gas imports, primarily sourced from the United States and Qatar. This development was made possible through the accelerated deployment of Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRUs) and planning of land-based terminals. The Wilhelmshaven FSRU, Germany's first LNG terminal, entered operation in December 2022 with a capacity of 5 billion cubic meters (BCM) per year. This was followed by the Mukran terminal, which obtained its operating license in mid-2024 and is expected to deliver up to 13.5 BCM annually into the national transmission network (IEA, 2025, pp. 35–36). Additionally, the Brunsbüttel land-based terminal, projected to be operational by 2027, represents a long-term infrastructural anchor (IEA, 2025, p. 85).

The legal and procedural foundation for this infrastructural shift was established by the LNG Acceleration Act, passed in 2022. This legislation significantly simplified permitting processes and mandated that

all land-based terminals must be hydrogen-ready by 2043, enabling a long-term pivot toward decarbonised fuels (IEA, 2025, p. 36). The law reflects a new paradigm of energy governance, where infrastructure must be not only rapidly deployable but also adaptable to future technological and environmental demands.

Since September 2022, Russian Gas has not been included in the German energy mix. The graph below illustrates the primary sources of natural gas (CLEW, 2024).




FIGURE 1. ORIGIN OF NATURAL GAS USED IN GERMANY. SOURCE: CLEAN ENERGY WIRE 2024: HTTPS://WWW.CLEANENERGYWIRE.ORG/FACTSHEETS/GERMANYS-DEPENDENCE-IMPORTED-FOSSIL-FUELS

The IEA underscores that Germany maintains the largest gas storage capacity in the European Union, exceeding 24 BCM, and that strategic storage targets were fully met ahead of the 2022–2023 heating season (IEA, 2025, p. 36). These logistical and infrastructural achievements were instrumental in preventing systemic supply shortfalls despite the loss of Russian volumes.

In conclusion, the LNG buildout marks not just a technical solution to a short-term crisis but a transformative shift in Germany's energy infrastructure logic. By moving from pipeline dependency to modular LNG flexibility, and linking this to future hydrogen capability, Germany has initiated a structural turn in its approach to gas security and energy sovereignty.

## 4. DISCUSSION

### PARTY POSITIONS ON RESOURCE POLICY POST-2022

The energy crisis sharpened the distinctions among Germany's major political parties in their approach to resource policy and supply security. While all parties recognised the urgency of diversification after the collapse of Russian imports, their interpretations of how to achieve sovereignty and sustainability diverged considerably.

CDU/CSU emphasised pragmatic security-of-supply measures. The party supported the rapid buildout of LNG infrastructure and advocated for the temporary reactivation of coal-fired plants, while also endorsing the expansion of gas storage capacities. Although formally committed to the goals of *Energiewende*, CDU/CSU remained cautious about overcommitting to volatile renewables without ensuring baseload security and industrial competitiveness.

SPD, as the leading force in the governing coalition, adopted a centrist balancing act. It pursued infrastructure acceleration, notably through the LNG Acceleration Act, but sought to cushion social impacts via energy subsidies and regulatory price caps. SPD also supported new long-term gas contracts with Qatar, Norway and the United States. However, critics from both left and right accused the party of strategic indecision – being caught between market logic, geopolitical alignment and ecological responsibility.

The Greens faced a complex dual challenge: defending ambitious climate policy while legitimising short-term fossil infrastructure expansion. Their framing of LNG terminals as "hydrogen-ready" infrastructure was central to squaring this tension. The party remained sceptical of new long-term gas contracts and voiced concern over carbon lock-in and fossil path dependency.

Finally, the AfD framed the crisis as evidence of ideological failure. It rejected the premises of decarbonisation altogether and called for a full return to domestic coal and nuclear power, often invoking national

sovereignty and cost-of-living arguments. In doing so, the party reinforced its identity as an anti-system actor using energy policy as a populist wedge issue, especially in eastern federal states.

This divergence illustrates that energy and resource politics are no longer technocratic matters but foundational issues of political identity and programmatic conflict.

## 5. CONCLUSION

The 2022 energy crisis revealed the structural fragility of Germany's energy system, rooted in decades of increasing dependency on imported fossil fuels – particularly Russian gas. This resource dependency significantly amplified the country's vulnerability during the crisis, confirming the core hypothesis that the lack of sufficient domestic reserves constituted a central risk factor. The disruption of gas supplies and resulting price shocks exposed the limitations of a model based on liberalised markets, import reliance and gradual transition.

In response, Germany undertook a rapid and multidimensional transformation of its energy policy, centred on securing alternative supply routes, expanding LNG infrastructure and reasserting the role of the state in critical energy functions. This comprehensive shift addressed the second research question: Germany's post-crisis management of gas shortages relied not only on technical infrastructure but also on emergency subsidies, strategic gas storage regulation and accelerated permitting procedures. While these measures enhanced short-term resilience, they also raised long-term questions about carbon lock-in and democratic legitimacy.

Politically, the crisis functioned as a catalyst for discursive polarisation. Parties interpreted the shock through ideologically distinct lenses, confirming the third research question. The AfD framed fossil fuel scarcity as a consequence of "eco-dictatorship" and positioned itself as a defender of national energy sovereignty. In contrast, the Greens attempted

to reconcile crisis management with long-term decarbonisation, while the SPD and CDU/CSU sought to balance affordability with energy security. These contrasting responses demonstrate that fossil resources are no longer neutral economic inputs, but highly politicised symbols of national strategy, identity and inequality.

In sum, the findings support the hypothesis that Germany's fossil fuel dependency not only shaped its crisis exposure but also triggered profound changes in political discourse and energy governance. The German case shows that resource management is now a central axis of democratic stability and strategic orientation, linking infrastructure, identity and institutional legitimacy.

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